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Abstract 
Violent conflict destroys resources. It generates “destruction costs.” These costs have an 
important effect on individuals’ decisions to cooperate or conflict. We develop two models of 
conflict: one in which conflict’s destruction costs are independent of individuals’ investments in 
“arms”—the tools of conflict—and another in which conflict’s destruction costs depend on those 
investments. Our models demonstrate that when conflict’s destruction costs are arms-dependent, 
conflict is more costly, making cooperation more likely. We test this prediction with a laboratory 
experiment in which subjects first choose how heavily to invest in arms and then choose whether 
to cooperate or conflict in an environment where interaction is repeated. In one set of treatments 
conflict’s destruction costs are arms-independent. In another they are arms-dependent. Our 
experimental results support our models’ predictions. Compared to when conflict’s destruction 
costs are arms-independent, when those costs are arms-dependent, cooperation increases by 
nearly a third. 
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1    Introduction 
Violent conflict destroys resources. It generates “destruction costs.” These costs have an 
important effect on individuals’ decisions to cooperate or conflict.  
 With the notable exception of Chang and Luo (2013), existing models of conflict treat 
conflict’s destruction costs as independent of individuals’ decisions to invest in “arms”—the 
tools of conflict. These models introduce conflict’s destruction costs through a “destructiveness 
parameter.” This parameter measures the amount of a contested resource violent conflict 
destroys. But it’s unconnected to individuals’ decisions about how many resources they devote to 
fighting (see, for instance, Grossman and Kim 1995; Anderton 2003; Garfkinkel and Skaperdas 
2000, 2007; McBride and Skaperdas 2010).
1
 
 In disconnecting the destructiveness parameter from individuals’ arms investments, 
existing models of conflict make an important and unusual assumption: conflicting individuals 
destroy as many resources when they devote everything to fighting as when they devote almost 
nothing to this purpose. Fights with fists are as destructive as fights with tanks and missiles. This 
assumption comports poorly with reality. Further, it has an important effect on existing models’ 
predictions about the scope for cooperation.  
 Consider McBride and Skaperdas’ (2010) work. These authors develop and 
experimentally test a model of conflict in which the possibility of repeated interaction between 
individuals increases the likelihood of conflict rather than reduces it as conventional folk 
theorem-type reasoning would suggest. As in other models of conflict, in theirs too, conflict’s 
destruction costs are arms-independent. The height of individuals’ arms investments doesn’t 
influence conflict’s destruction costs. But the height of those investments does influence 
individuals’ decisions to cooperate or conflict. Higher arms investments make conflict more 
likely, reducing the scope for cooperation. 
 The intuition behind this result is sensible. When individuals invest in more arms, an 
armed peace is more expensive. Thus individuals are more likely to conflict. 
                                                 
1
 In earlier models of conflict violent clashes never occur. “[T]here is coercive taking but no actual battle” 
(Hirshleifer 1988: 204). Because of this, conflict destroys no resources. So conflict’s destruction cost is zero (see, 
for instance, Hirshleifer (1988, 1991, 1995). 
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 But this intuition is incomplete. Its incompleteness stems from its assumption of arms-
independent destruction costs. If conflict’s destruction costs are arms-dependent, a 
countervailing force emerges.  
 As Chang and Luo (2013) show, when individuals invest in more arms, conflicts that 
occur are more destructive. This makes conflict more costly, inducing individuals to cooperate 
more.
2
 The additional cooperation that heavier arms investments induce by raising the price of an 
armed clash may completely offset the additional conflict they induce by raising the price of an 
armed peace.
3
  
 Our paper follows this line of reasoning. We argue that by ignoring destruction costs’ 
arms-dependence, existing studies of conflict overpredict the likelihood of conflict. If instead, 
more reasonably, we allow conflict’s destruction costs to be arms-dependent, cooperation is 
more likely.
4
  
 We develop two competing models of conflict—one with arms-independent destruction 
costs and another with arms-dependent destruction costs—to demonstrate this. Unlike 
conventional models of conflict whose arms-independent destruction costs assumption, in 
Grossman and Kim’s (1995: 1279) words, precludes “an internal explanation for violence and 
destruction,” our model of conflict with arms-dependent destruction costs provides one. 
 We test our competing models of conflict with a laboratory experiment in which subjects 
choose whether to cooperate or conflict. Our experiment builds on McBride and Skaperdas 
(2010). Paired subjects engage in a repeated game. Subjects choose to “Cooperate,” by splitting a 
resource of fixed value, or to “Conflict,” in which case one subject receives the entire resource 
according to a fixed probability distribution. But before making that choice, subjects choose 
arms investments.  
                                                 
2
 Leeson (2009: 500) makes this point in the context of the Anglo-Scottish border reivers—a society of persons bent 
on plundering each other as a way of life. As he points out, “instead of this situation preventing decentralized 
institutions from emerging to govern them, if anything, it seems that these bandits’ animosity enhanced the 
importance of developing a system to oversee intergroup interactions and, thus, both groups’ incentive to devise 
institutions for regulating their predatory inclinations.” See also, Leeson and Nowrasteh (2011). 
3
 A similar effort by Amegashie and Runkel (2012) shows how the desire for revenge may have the countervailing 
effect of decreasing the likelihood of conflict.  Their argument, echoing the logic of our own, is that the increased 
future cost of revenge-laden conflict may reduce the desire for conflict in the present. 
 
4
 Though we do not pursue this line of reasoning, it is plausible that this would complement other cooperation-
inducing parameters used to enhance simpler models of conflict.  See, for example, Kimbrough and Sheremeta 
(2013) for an analysis of the role of side-payments in inducing cooperative outcomes. 
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 In one set of treatments we follow McBride and Skaperdas’ model and experimental 
environment: conflict’s destruction costs are arms-independent. In another set of treatments we 
modify that environment to make those costs arms-dependent. In these treatments, when subjects 
invest in more arms, more resources are destroyed when they clash and vice versa. 
 Our experiment’s results support our models’ predictions. When conflict’s destruction 
costs depend on subjects’ arms investments, subjects cooperate more. When conflict’s 
destruction costs are independent of subjects’ arms investments, subjects cooperate less. The 
change in cooperation that going from arms-independent to arms-dependent destruction costs 
generates is substantial. Compared to when conflict’s destruction costs are arms-independent, 
when those costs are arms-dependent, cooperation increases by nearly a third. 
 To further explore the relationship between arms investments and individuals’ decisions 
to cooperate or conflict we consider two additional treatments that vary the price of investing in 
arms and thus the level of arms investments that subjects make. We find that when arms are 
cheaper, and thus subjects are better armed, they’re more likely to cooperate. When arms are 
more expensive, and thus subjects invest less in arms, they’re more likely to conflict. This 
finding is consistent with the reasoning our models describe. By making for better armed 
individuals, cheaper arms raise conflict’s destruction costs when conflict occurs. In doing so 
cheaper arms promote cooperation. 
 
2    Two Models of Conflict 
2.1    Background 
A growing literature tests models of conflict experimentally (for surveys of this literature, see 
Abbink 2012; Dechenaux, Kovenock, and Sheremeta 2013). But most of the models this 
literature tests assume that conflict destroys no resources (see, for instance, Durham, Hirshleifer, 
and Smith 1998; Carter and Anderton 2001; Duffy and Kim 2005). Its destruction cost is zero.  
 McBride and Skaperdas’ (2010) work is an exception to this. So, too, is Lacomba et al.’s 
(2013) work. Although our experimental design most closely follows McBride and Skaperdas, 
the question Lacomba et al. study is most closely related to ours.  
 Lacomba et al. conduct an experiment where subjects compete for a resource. In two 
treatments, a conflict’s loser may choose to destroy part or all of the resource before the 
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conflict’s winner claims it. Lacomba et al. find that when losers can increase conflict’s 
destruction costs, subjects cooperate more.  
 Our experimental environment extends Lacomba et al.’s insight by making conflict’s 
destruction costs arms-dependent. Lacomba et al. (2013) consider how post-conflict 
distributional decisions influence cooperation and conflict. We consider how pre-conflict arming 
decisions influence these decisions. In doing so our analysis emphasizes the interactive 
consequences of conflict itself rather the consequences of decisions individuals may make after 
violent clashes are over. 
 
2.2    Arms-Independent Destruction Costs 
We begin with a conventional model of violent conflict where conflict’s destruction costs are 
arms-independent. We consider a model of conflict based on McBride and Skaperdas (2010). In 
this model there are two parties, i and j, who compete over a resource, Y, in n rounds of 
interaction. They do so by investing in arms.  
 First, i and j decide how many arms to invest in, ai and aj, respectively. Their arms levels 
are common knowledge.
5
 Next they decide whether to cooperate by splitting the contested 
resource according to their relative arms strengths or to conflict to try to obtain a greater share of 
the resource. Cooperation requires both parties’ consent. If either party chooses to not cooperate, 
the result is conflict. 
 Parties choose their arms levels and whether to cooperate or conflict in the first round of 
interaction only. Their decisions to cooperate or conflict in round one carry forward to all 
subsequent rounds. To enforce an armed peace, parties must maintain their arms levels in each 
round of interaction. Thus, if they cooperate in round one, they incur the cost of their arms 
investments in each subsequent round. Any deviation from this arms level would, of course, 
invite conflict from the other party. 
                                                 
5
 For the sake of parsimony, we assume that the chosen arming level is the same whether the parties choose to 
cooperate or engage in conflict. While this assumption is perhaps unrealistic (see Levento-lu and Slantchev 2007), 
we use it to focus the reader’s attention on the principal variable of interest, destruction costs. Further, we relax the 
assumption in the experiment below and derive optimal arming levels under both cooperative and conflictual 
conditions, given the parameters of the experimental design. Note that relaxing the assumption does not change the 
expected outcome of greater conflict when destruction is arms-dependent. 
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 If the parties cooperate, they split Y according to their relative strengths.
6
 Those strengths 
are determined by their relative arms levels. The following contest success function describes i’s 
share of Y, Pi,j: 
(1) 
      
    
          
  
 
Thus, if the parties cooperate, i earns: 
(2) 
       [ (
    
          
)      ]    (   )  
 
 Conflict destroys part of the contested resource. How much of that resource it destroys 
depends on an exogenously determined destructiveness parameter,    (0, 1). Resources 
destroyed in the first round of conflict remain destroyed in subsequent rounds.
7
 
 If the parties conflict in round one, the contest success function Pi,j describes the 
probability that i is victorious over j. The conflict’s winner remains arms-superior, and so 
victorious, in all subsequent rounds. Thus, in the event of conflict, parties incur the cost of their 
arms investments in the first round of interaction only. Unlike the cooperative outcome, they 
needn’t maintain their arms levels in subsequent rounds because the conflict winner’s first-round 
victory vanquishes his opponent permanently. 
 When parties conflict, in the first round of interaction the winner earns the value of the 
contested resource, less the value of what’s been destroyed by the conflict, less the cost of his 
arms investment. For all subsequent rounds the conflict’s winner earns the full value of the 
contested resource, less the value of the resource that was destroyed. In the first round of 
interaction the loser earns zero, less the cost of his arms investment. For all subsequent rounds he 
earns zero. Thus, if the parties conflict, i’s earns: 
                                                 
6
 There are, of course, other bargaining solutions that the parties may agree to. We adopt the “split the surplus” rule 
presented in Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) as it makes no assumption regarding prior commitments to less costly 
bargaining solutions by the parties. See Anbarci et al. (2002) for a discussion of alternative bargaining solutions that 
do make such an assumption. 
7
 This assumption departs from McBride and Skaperdas (2010) who assume that resources destroyed in conflict in 
one round of interaction reappear in subsequent rounds of interaction. Since these resources now remain destroyed, 
the likelihood of conflict is lower in our model. 
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(3) 
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)]         (   )   (   )  
 When conflict’s destruction costs are arms-independent, i therefore cooperates when: 
(4.1) 
 [ (
    
          
)      ]    (
    
          
) [   ]        
This is when: 
(4.2) 
  
(   )(          )
  
  
 
j’s decision is symmetric. So (4.2) characterizes when he cooperates too. 
 Examining (4.2) we find that the destructiveness parameter is positively related to the 
likelihood of cooperation. The number of rounds of interaction is negatively related to the 
likelihood of cooperation. And, crucially, arms levels are negatively related to the likelihood of 
cooperation. The more parties invest in arms, the more likely they are to conflict.  
 The reason for this result stems from this model’s assumption that conflict’s destruction 
costs are arms-independent. Fighting with fists destroys as many resources as fighting with tanks 
and missiles. So conflict’s destruction cost is the same no matter how many resources parties 
invest in arms as long as those investments are positive. Higher arms levels have no effect on 
conflict’s cost. But they have a positive effect on cooperation’s cost. When parties’ arms levels 
are higher, an armed peace is more expensive. Thus higher arms levels make conflict more 
likely. 
 It’s useful to see how adding a price scalar to arms may influence parties’ decisions to 
cooperate or conflict when conflict’s destruction costs are arms-independent. Consider a price 
scalar of arms w > 0. This price is the same for both parties.  
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 Now if the parties cooperate, i earns: 
(5) 
       [ (
    
          
)       ]    (   )  
 
And if the parties conflict, i earns: 
(6) 
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 Thus the parties cooperate when: 
(7.1) 
 [ (
    
          
)       ]    (
    
          
) [   ]         
 
This is when: 
(7.2) 
 
  
(   )(          ) 
  
  
 
 Examining (7.2) we find that the price parameter is negatively related to the likelihood of 
cooperation. This result stems from the influence that cheaper arms have on the price of an 
armed peace. When arms are cheaper, the relative price of an armed peace is lower. Cheaper 
arms therefore improve the likelihood of cooperation.
8
 
 This result illustrates the crucial difference between the demand for arming and the 
demand for conflict.  Previous papers in the conflict literature (see Hirshleifer 1995, McBride 
                                                 
8
 We do not examine the secondary effects of this price scalar on the demand for arms. Since the demand for arms is 
negatively associated with its price, it is possible that a large enough scalar would sufficiently lower demand to 
negate the destructive cost of conflict we describe below. We consider this a fringe result, however, as the material 
cost of arming decreases with technological advancement and therefore the focus of our model—where destructive 
costs must be balanced against arms investment—would inevitably come into play. For a detailed account of 
technological advancement as it pertains to arming, see Rotte and Schmidt (2003). 
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and Skaperdas 2006) depict the relationship between the price of arms and the quantity of 
conflict as negative.
9
   
 Yet, the standard demand-curve relationship only applies of necessity to the relationship 
between the price of arms and quantity of arms demanded.  It does not necessarily imply a 
corresponding negative relationship between the price of arms and the quantity of conflict 
demanded, unless the only constraint to conflict is the cost of arming.   
 When persons choosing conflict must not only reckon with the cost of arms but the cost 
of destruction as well, then it no longer follows that a decrease in the price of arms inevitably 
triggers more conflict. 
 Chang and Luo (2013) pursue this line of thought extensively with a model depicting 
various endogenous relationships between arms and destruction.  For example, by assuming that 
resource destruction is an increasing function of arms investment, they find that cooperation 
dominates conflict once the cost of destruction outweighs the opportunity cost of an armed 
peace.
10
   
 Our purpose is to better understand how these costs map into the decision to engage in 
conflict.  As we demonstrate in the next section—and later, test experimentally—how one 
models the relationship between these costs and the gains under conflict largely determines the 
likelihood of conflict’s occurrence.   
 
2.3    Arms-Dependent Destruction Costs 
In this section we modify the foregoing model of conflict in one critical way: we permit 
conflict’s destruction costs to be arms-dependent. We do this by connecting the destructiveness 
parameter,  , to the level of arms parties choose to invest in, ai and aj. Now how much of the 
contested resource conflict destroys depends on parties’ arms levels. Specifically, we assume that 
resource destruction in the event of conflict is given by  (ai + aj). 
 If the parties cooperate, i earns the same as in (2). But if the parties conflict, i now earns: 
                                                 
9
 A similar placement of the scalar w into the model presented in McBride and Skaperdas (2010) would, like our 
model, result in a positive relationship between the price of arms and conflict.  The authors do not comment upon 
this implicit outcome. 
10
Again, Amegashie and Runkel (2012) provide one such input to these destruction costs: the notion of revenge.  If 
the desire for revenge is relatively elastic with respect to destruction costs, then an escalation of conflict can ensue, 
further damaging the contested resource.  Such a result would only increase the relevance of the framework we 
develop in Section 2.3. 
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(8) 
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 When conflict’s destruction costs are arms-dependent, the parties therefore cooperate 
when: 
(9.1) 
 [ (
    
          
)      ]    (
    
          
) [   (          )]        
 
This is when: 
(9.2) 
  
(   )
  
  
 
j’s decision is symmetric. So (9.2) characterizes when he cooperates too. 
 Examining (9.2) we find that, as in (4.2), the destructiveness parameter is positively 
related to the likelihood of cooperation. Further, the number of rounds of interaction is 
negatively related to the likelihood of cooperation.  
 However, unlike in (4.2), in (9.2) higher arms levels are no longer correlated with an 
increase in the likelihood of conflict. Here, arms levels have both a conflict-enhancing and 
cooperation-enhancing effect on the costs of conflict. The conflict-enhancing effect that higher 
arms investments have on the cost of an armed peace in the previous model—where conflict’s 
destruction costs are arms-independent—is “cancelled out” by the cooperation-enhancing effect 
that higher arms investments have on conflict’s cost in this model where conflict’s destruction 
costs are arms-dependent. The reason for this “cancelling” is simple: when destruction costs are 
arms-dependent, conflict with higher arms levels destroys more resources. This mutes the effect 
that higher arms levels have on the price of an armed peace. Compared to the previous model 
with arms-independent destruction costs, this model with arms-dependent destruction costs 
predicts greater scope for cooperation. 
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 It’s useful to see how adding a price scalar to arms may influence parties’ decisions to 
cooperate or conflict when conflict’s destruction costs are arms-dependent. If the parties 
cooperate, i earns the same as in (5) above. But if the parties conflict, i earns: 
 (10) 
       [ [   (          )] (
    
          
)]          
  (   )   (   )    (          )  
  
Thus the parties cooperate when:  
(11.1) 
 [ (
    
          
)       ]    (
    
          
) [   (          )]         
 
This is when: 
(11.2) 
  
(   ) 
  
  
 
 Examining (11.2) we find that w has the same effect on cooperation as (7.2). The price 
parameter is negatively related to the likelihood of conflict.
11
 Thus, when arms are cheaper, 
cooperation is more likely. In this model, however, where conflict’s destruction costs are arms-
dependent, we may apply a different interpretation to this result than we did in the previous 
model where conflict’s destruction costs are arms independent. That interpretation is this: when 
arms are cheaper, individuals invest in more of them. So, when conflict occurs, there’s more 
destruction. That makes conflict more costly. This, in turn, encourages individuals to cooperate. 
 
3    Experimental Design 
3.1    Experimental Parameters 
                                                 
11
 Note that we assume that the specific arms bought do not change with the price parameter.  In other words, more 
expensive arms are assumed to be no more destructive than cheaper arms.  Instead, we use the price parameter 
strictly as a proxy for scarcity of arms.  An interesting extension of our model would make room for heterogeneity in 
the choice of weapons.  We thank an anonymous referee for this insight into our model. 
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We test the models developed above experimentally using four treatments. These treatments fall 
into two sets. In one set, conflict’s destruction costs are arms-dependent. In the other, conflict’s 
destruction costs are arms-independent.
12
 
 Our first treatment, PRIME, experimentally tests our model of conflict with arms-
dependent destruction costs—the model in Section 2.3. Here subjects compete over a resource 
worth E$100 in repeated rounds of interaction. In Round 1 they make two decisions. First they 
decide what level of arms to invest in. Next they decide whether to “Cooperate” or “Conflict.” 13 
 We randomly pair subjects in eight matches using a computer program. This pairing 
changes every match. Before each match we provide each subject with an endowment of E$50 to 
compensate for potentially negative earnings. The number of rounds in which a pair of subjects 
interacts is randomly determined according to the fixed continuation probability of 0.75. Subjects 
are aware of this.  
 In Round 1 subjects choose to purchase between 0 and 5 arms units. Each unit costs a 
subject $E10. Subjects are then informed about the arms level that the other member of their pair 
has chosen. Next, subjects choose to cooperate or conflict.  
 Both subjects must choose to cooperate for cooperation to occur. A decision to cooperate 
carries forward into all subsequent rounds of interaction. If a pair of subjects cooperates in 
Round 1, in every round of interaction subject i earns a share of the contested resource’s value 
(E$100), Pi, where Pi depends on his relative arms strength such that 
 
    
  
      
  
 
less the cost of his arms purchases, ai. 
 If a pair of subjects conflicts in Round 1, each arms unit either subject has purchased 
permanently destroys E$10 of the contested resource and thus reduces the contested resource’s 
total value by E$10*(      ) for each round of interaction. The conflict’s winner and loser is 
decided in Round 1 by computer software programmed to determine the winner according to 
                                                 
12
 We borrow language from instructions presented in Lacomba et al. (2013). See the experiment instructions in the 
appendix. 
13
 We use less provocative language in our instructions, such as “Option A” and “Option B” in place of “Cooperate” 
and “Conflict.” See the experiment instructions in the Appendix. 
13 
 
subjects’ relative arms strengths where Pi is i’s probability of victory. A decision to conflict 
carries forward into all subsequent rounds of interaction. So does the winner’s and loser’s 
identity from Round 1. 
 In Round 1 a conflict’s winner earns the total value of the undestroyed resource, less his 
arms expenditures. In all subsequent rounds he earns the total value of the undestroyed resource. 
In Round 1 a conflict’s loser earns zero, less his arms expenditures. In all subsequent rounds he 
earns zero. 
 
3.2    Treatment Comparisons 
We use three comparison treatments to isolate the effects of (1) making conflict’s destruction 
costs arms-independent and (2) altering the price of arms on subjects’ decisions to “Cooperate” 
or “Conflict.” Together with our benchmark treatment, these comparison treatments form a box 
design presented in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Experiment Box Design 
 Arms-Dependent Destruction Costs Arms-Independent Destruction Costs 
Low Arms Price PRIME  BASE 
High Arms Price PRIME PRICE BASE PRICE 
 
 In our first comparison treatment, BASE, we isolate the effect of disconnecting conflict’s 
destruction costs from arms levels on subjects’ decisions to cooperate or conflict. BASE follows 
the use of the destructiveness parameter in conventional models of conflict where conflict’s 
destruction costs are arms-independent. It tests the model of conflict in Section 2.2. Thus this 
treatment follows PRIME with one modification. The value of the contested resource that 
conflict destroys is the same regardless of how many arms units subjects purchase. Conflict 
always destroys E$10 of this resource. 
 In our second and third comparison treatments, PRIME PRICE and BASE PRICE, we 
isolate the effect of changing the price of arms on subjects’ decisions to cooperate or conflict. To 
do so we increase the price of arms units from E$10, their price in PRIME and BASE, to E$30. 
14 
 
Thus PRIME PRICE is the same as PRIME and BASE PRICE is the same as BASE except that 
arms units cost E$30 in the “Price” treatments instead of E$10.  
 In our “Price” treatments it’s possible for subjects to incur negative earnings for the 
match. To ensure that earnings in each match are independent, we implemented a rule in all 
treatments that informed subjects that any negative earnings would automatically be rounded up 
to zero.
14
 
 
3.3    Procedures 
We conducted nine sessions using 108 subjects from the at-large student body at George Mason 
University. Each session had 12 participants who participated in only a single session of this 
experiment. We seated subjects at visually isolated computer terminals where they interacted 
anonymously with other subjects. Sessions lasted approximately two hours including 25 minutes 
of instructions.  
 Subjects received instructions about how to participate in the experiment (see the 
Appendix). This was followed by a quiz of seven questions about how the experiment works to 
ensure subjects’ understanding of the experimental procedures. Subjects received $7 for showing 
up on time in addition to what they earned in the experiment. Average earnings without the 
show-up payment were $20.97. We paid earnings privately at the experiment’s conclusion. 
 In each session subjects participated in eight matches. And in each session we 
implemented two treatments. We implemented the first treatment in Matches 1 through 4. We 
implemented the second treatment in Matches 5 through 8.  
 To mitigate the end-game effects of a necessarily finite experiment, we didn’t disclose 
the total number of matches to subjects. We used a within-treatment design where each treatment 
was conducted alongside its most closely related counterpart (i.e. PRIME PRICE with PRIME 
and BASE PRICE with BASE). This minimized the number of design changes within each 
session, reducing the cognitive burden imposed on our subjects. We randomized the order of 
                                                 
14
 Negative earnings occurred approximately 30% of the time in the BASE PRICE and PRIME PRICE treatments, 
ranging from 20.83% to 47.92%. Subjects were not informed if they received negative earnings in a given period. 
They simply received a $0 in earnings. We also ran a Probit regression to determine whether negative earnings had 
an effect on their subsequent choice to engage in conflict; that is, whether knowing that their earnings would be 
rounded up to zero caused them to make riskier decisions. We fail to reject the hypothesis that acquiring negative 
earnings had no influence on their subsequent conflict decision at the 95% confidence level (p-value = 0.073). Still, 
given the relatively low p-value, we do not rule out altogether the influence this may have had in instigating greater 
levels of conflict in our PRICE treatments. 
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treatments across sessions. Table 2 summarizes the ordering of treatments conducted for each 
session.    
 
Table 2. Treatment Order by Session 
Session 1 Prime:Prime Price 
Session 2 Prime:Prime Price 
Session 3 Prime:Prime Price 
Session 4 Prime Price:Prime 
Session 5 Prime Price:Prime 
Session 6 Base Price:Base 
Session 7 Base Price:Base 
Session 8 Base:Base Price 
Session 9 Base:Base Price 
 
4    Hypotheses 
The competing models of conflict developed in Section 2 deliver competing predictions about 
the likelihood of cooperation and conflict. Together with the parameters our experimental 
treatments use, these models form the basis of our hypotheses for our experimental tests.  
 In PRIME our parameters are: 
 
                      
 
Plugging these parameters into (11.2) from above yields: 
 
    
(   )  
 (   )
  
 
Thus PRIME generates a cooperative equilibrium for all arms strategies. Table 3 presents the 
outcomes predicted for each possible combination of arms levels and conflict decision. Each of 
these outcomes reflects the Pareto-optimal strategy for each subject. In this and the following 
figure we italicize the subgame perfect equilibria. 
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Table 3. Expected Outcomes in PRIME and PRIME PRICE 
  
             
  
  
  
PRIME 
 
PRIME PRICE   
  
             
  
  
  
Player 1
 
Player 2
 
Player 1
 
Player 2   
  
             
  
  
  
Coop Conf 
 
Coop Conf 
 
Coop Conf 
 
Coop Conf   
Player 1 Arming Level Player 2 Arming Level 
            
  
  
             
  
0 0  200 200  200 200  200 200  200 200   
  1 
 
0 0   360 350   0 0 
 
280 330   
  2 
 
0 0   320 300   0 0 
 
160 260   
  3 
 
0 0   280 250   0 0 
 
40 190   
  4 
 
0 0   240 200   0 0 
 
-80 120   
  5 
 
0 0   200 150   0 0 
 
-200 50   
    
 
            
 
  
 
      
1 0  360 350   0 0   280 330  0 0   
  1 
 
160 150   160 150   80 130 
 
80 130   
  2 
 
93 83   187 167   13 63 
 
27 127   
  3 
 
60 50   180 150   -20 30 
 
-60 90   
  4 
 
40 30   160 120   -40 10 
 
-160 40   
  5 
 
27 17   133 83   -53 -3 
 
-267 -17   
    
 
            
 
  
 
      
2 0  320 300   0 0   160 260  0 0   
  1 
 
187 167   93 83   27 127 
 
13 63   
  2 
 
120 100   120 100   -40 60 
 
-40 60   
  3 
 
80 60   120 90   -80 20 
 
-120 30   
  4 
 
53 33   107 67   -107 -7 
 
-213 -13   
  5 
 
34 14   86 36   -126 -26 
 
-314 -64   
    
 
            
 
  
 
      
3 0  280 250   0 0   40 190  0 0   
  1 
 
180 150   60 50   -60 90 
 
-20 30   
  2 
 
120 90   80 60   -120 30 
 
-80 20   
  3 
 
80 50   80 50   -160 -10 
 
-160 -10   
  4 
 
51 21   69 29   -189 -39 
 
-251 -51   
  5 
 
30 0   50 0   -210 -60 
 
-350 -100   
    
 
            
 
  
 
      
4 0  240 200   0 0   -80 120  0 0   
  1 
 
160 120   40 30   -160 40 
 
-40 10   
  2 
 
107 67   53 33   -213 -13 
 
-107 -7   
  3 
 
69 29   51 21   -251 -51 
 
-189 -39   
  4 
 
40 0   40 0   -280 -80 
 
-280 -80   
  5 
 
18 -22   22 -28   -302 -102 
 
-378 -128   
    
 
            
 
  
 
      
5 0  200 150   0 0   -200 50  0 0   
  1 
 
133 83   27 17   -267 -17 
 
-53 -3   
  2 
 
86 36   34 14   -314 -64 
 
-126 -26   
  3 
 
50 0   30 0   -350 -100 
 
-210 -60   
  4 
 
22 -28   18 -22   -378 -128 
 
-302 -102   
  5 
 
0 -50   0 -50   -400 -150 
 
-400 -150   
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In PRIME the subgame perfect equilibrium occurs when both subjects invest in two units of 
arms. This equilibrium is cooperative. Thus, while it behooves subject to arm, this doesn’t 
necessitate conflict. 
 In PRIME PRICE we increase the price of arms in PRIME from 10 to 30. Plugging these 
new parameters (                    ) into (11.2) yields: 
 
    
(   )  
 (   )
  
 
Thus PRIME PRICE generates a conflictual equilibrium for all arms strategies. Table 3 also 
predicts the outcome for each possible combination of arms levels and conflict decision given 
PRIME PRICE’s parameters.  Here the subgame perfect equilibrium occurs when both subjects 
invest in one unit of arms. 
Compared to PRIME, subjects invest in fewer arms and engage in more conflict. Notably, 
increasing the price of arms doesn’t increase the price of conflict. It decreases it. The opportunity 
cost of conflict—armed peace—is lower when the price of arms is higher. Subjects must 
maintain arms levels under cooperation to sustain an armed peace. But since after only one round 
of conflict the victor’s and the vanquished’s identities are permanently established, subjects can 
“disarm” after only one round of conflict. Compared to PRIME, then, where arms are cheaper, 
PRIME PRICE generates more conflict. 
 BASE uses the same parameters as PRIME: 
 
                     
 
However, here both cooperative and conflictual outcomes are possible. Table 4 predicts 
outcomes for each possible combination of arms levels and conflict in BASE and BASE PRICE. 
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Table 4. Expected Outcomes in BASE and BASE PRICE 
  
            
  
  
  
BASE
 
BASE PRICE 
  
               
  
Player 1 
 
Player 2 
 
Player 1 
 
Player 2 
  
            
  
  
  
Coop Conf 
 
Coop Conf 
 
Coop Conf 
 
Coop Conf 
Player 1 Arming Level Player 2 Arming Level 
           
  
  
            
  
0 0   200 180   200 180   200 180   200 180 
  1 
 
0 0   360 350   0 0 
 
280 330 
  2 
 
0 0   320 340   0 0 
 
160 300 
  3 
 
0 0   280 330   0 0 
 
40 270 
  4 
 
0 0   240 320   0 0 
 
-80 240 
  5 
 
0 0   200 310   0 0 
 
-200 210 
    
 
                
 
    
1 0  360 350   0 0   280 330  0 0 
  1 
 
160 170   160 170   80 150 
 
80 150 
  2 
 
93 110   187 220   13 90 
 
27 180 
  3 
 
60 80   180 240   -20 60 
 
-60 180 
  4 
 
40 62   160 248   -40 42 
 
-160 168 
  5 
 
27 50   133 250   -53 30 
 
-267 150 
    
 
                     
2 0   320 340   0 0   160 300 
 
0 0 
  1 
 
187 220   93 110   27 180 
 
13 90 
  2 
 
120 160   120 160   -40 120 
 
-40 120 
  3 
 
80 124   120 186   -80 84 
 
-120 126 
  4 
 
53 100   107 200   -107 60 
 
-213 120 
  5 
 
34 83   86 207   -126 43 
 
-314 107 
    
 
                
 
    
3 0  280 330   0 0   40 270  0 0 
  1 
 
180 240   60 80   -60 180 
 
-20 60 
  2 
 
120 186   80 124   -120 126 
 
-80 84 
  3 
 
80 150   80 150   -160 90 
 
-160 90 
  4 
 
51 124   69 166   -189 64 
 
-251 86 
  5 
 
30 105   50 175   -210 45 
 
-350 75 
    
 
                
 
    
4 0   240 320   0 0   -80 240   0 0 
  1 
 
160 248   40 62   -160 168 
 
-40 42 
  2 
 
107 200   53 100   -213 120 
 
-107 60 
  3 
 
69 166   51 124   -251 86 
 
-189 64 
  4 
 
40 140   40 140   -280 60 
 
-280 60 
  5 
 
18 120   22 150   -302 40 
 
-378 50 
    
 
                
 
    
5 0   200 310   0 0   -200 210   0 0 
  1 
 
133 250   27 50   -267 150 
 
-53 30 
  2 
 
86 207   34 83   -314 107 
 
-126 43 
  3 
 
50 175   30 105   -350 75 
 
-210 45 
  4 
 
22 150   18 120   -378 50 
 
-302 40 
  5 
 
0 130   0 130   -400 30 
 
-400 30 
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The subgame perfect equilibrium for BASE occurs when both subjects invest in the maximum 
number of arms units. This equilibrium is conflictual. Conflict’s destruction costs are arms-
independent. Thus conflict’s cost is lower than it is in PRIME. The result is more conflict.   
Finally, in BASE PRICE we increase the price of arms in BASE to 30. Table 4 also 
predicts outcomes using this treatment’s parameters. Here the subgame perfect equilibrium 
occurs when both subjects invest in three units of arms. This equilibrium is conflictual. 
Compared to BASE, the higher price of arms here makes an armed peace more expensive. This 
promotes more conflict compared to BASE. Further, conflict’s destruction costs are arms-
independent here. This promotes conflict compared to PRIME. 
 The foregoing analysis delivers four hypotheses: 
 
H1: Conflict’s incidence will rank by treatment BASE PRICE>BASE>PRIME 
PRICE>PRIME. 
  
H2: Arms investments will rank by treatment BASE>BASE PRICE> PRIME>PRIME PRICE. 
 
H3: In PRIME and PRIME PRICE arms levels and cooperation will be uncorrelated.   
 
H4: In BASE and BASE PRICE arms levels will be negatively correlated with cooperation. 
 
5    Experimental Results 
Table 5 presents the basic results of our experimental investigation. 
 
Table 5. Summary of Experimental Results 
Treatment # of subjects 
# of times 
conflict chosen 
Average arms 
level 
 
# of subjects 
who chose 
conflict only 
# of subjects 
who chose 
conflict at 
least once 
PRIME 60 90 (37.5%) 3.03 7 (11.7%) 41 (68.3%) 
BASE 48 139 (72.4%) 3.85 21 (43.7%) 46 (95.8%) 
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PRIME PRICE 60 132 (55%) 1.99 14 (23.3%)  51 (85%) 
BASE PRICE 48 134 (69%) 2.65 15 (31.3%) 47 (97.9%) 
 
Result 1:  When conflict’s destruction cost is arms-dependent, there’s less conflict. 
 Conflict is least frequent in PRIME, followed by PRIME PRICE, BASE, and BASE 
PRICE. We further compared the treatments using a series of nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sign 
tests. We firmly reject the null hypothesis that PRIME and PRIME PRICE display equal 
occurrences of conflict (z = 3.345, p-value = 0.0008). We also firmly reject the null hypothesis 
that PRIME and BASE display equal occurrences of conflict (z = 4.623, p-value = 0.0000). 
This follows our predictions fairly closely, with the minor exception of BASE and BASE 
PRICE, which are indistinguishable (z = 0.773, p-value = 0.4395). Comparing PRIME and 
BASE, we find that the number of subjects who exclusively choose conflict nearly quadruples in 
percentage terms when the link between conflict’s destruction costs and arms investments is 
severed. 
 
Result 2: When the price of arms is higher, arms levels are lower.   
 Arms levels are lowest in PRIME PRICE, followed by BASE PRICE, PRIME, and BASE. 
This follows our predictions with the exception of BASE PRICE, which more closely follows its 
counterpart, PRIME PRICE, than predicted. 
 
Result 3: When conflict’s destruction cost is arms-dependent, arms levels and cooperation are 
uncorrelated.   
 To investigate how arms levels are related to subjects’ decisions to cooperate or conflict 
we performed a Probit regression analysis of our results. In each session each subject makes 
eight decisions about whether to “Cooperate” or “Conflict.” Four of these decisions occur in 
each of the two treatments tested in each session. If a subject chooses to conflict, we code this as 
a “1.” If the subject chooses to cooperate, we code this as a “0.” To create our dependent variable 
we average each subject’s four decisions in each treatment. 
 We group our data by pooling PRIME with PRIME PRICE and BASE and BASE PRICE. 
The first Probit regression considers PRIME and PRIME PRICE. It estimates the effect of 
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average arms levels by subject and a dummy for treatment comparison on the subsequent choice 
of conflict or cooperation. Consider Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Results of Probit Test: PRIME and PRIME PRICE 
Observations: 120      
       
Variable p-value Coefficient SE df/dx 
Arms Level 0.981 0.003 0.134 0.001 
Treatment Dummy (Prime Price=1, Prime=0) 0.058 0.563 0.297 0.168 
 
In the “Prime” treatments the coefficient on Arms Level is nearly zero and statistically 
insignificant. Arms Level has no effect on subjects’ decisions to cooperate or conflict (see 
footnote 4).  
 
Result 4: When the price of arms is higher, there’s more conflict. 
 In the “Prime” treatments the coefficient on the Treatment Dummy is sizable and 
statistically significant. When arms are cheaper, subjects cooperate more. Going from PRIME, 
where arms cost $E10, to PRIME PRICE, where they cost $E30, increases the probability of 
conflict by more than 56 percent.  
 
Result 5: When conflict’s destruction cost is arms-independent, arms levels are negatively 
correlated with cooperation. 
 We analyze how arms levels are related to subjects’ decisions to cooperate or conflict in 
BASE and BASE PRICE in the same manner that we do for PRIME and PRIME PRICE above. 
Consider Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Results of Probit Test: BASE and BASE PRICE 
Observations: 96      
       
Variable p-value Coefficient SE df/dx 
Arms Level 0.056 0.468 0.244 0.017 
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Treatment Dummy (Base Price=1, Base=0) 0.172 0.898 0.658 0.037 
 
In the “Base” treatments the coefficient on Arms Level is sizable and statistically significant. 
Arms Level has a positive effect on subjects’ decisions to conflict. Each additional unit of arms 
purchased increases the probability that a subject chooses conflict nearly 50 percent. The 
Treatment Dummy is positive but statistically insignificant. Arms prices are unrelated to 
subjects’ decisions to cooperate or conflict. 
 
Result 6: Establishing/severing a connection between arms investments and conflict’s 
destruction cost has a larger effect on the prevalence of conflict than changing the price of 
arms. 
 To see which feature of our experiment is the more important determinant of whether 
subjects choose to cooperate or conflict—establishing/severing the connection between conflict’s 
destruction costs and arms investments or changing the price of arms—we perform t-test 
comparisons. 
 A t-test comparison of the decision to cooperate or conflict in PRIME versus PRIME 
PRICE produces a mean difference of 17.08 percent. Compared to when arms cost $E30, when 
arms cost $E10, cooperation increases by approximately 17 percent. A t-test comparing the 
decision to cooperate or conflict in PRIME versus BASE produces a mean difference of 32.29 
percent. Compared to when conflict’s destruction costs are arms-independent, when those costs 
are arms-dependent, cooperation increases by nearly a third. 
 
6    Conclusion 
Violent conflict’s destruction costs are a central aspect of its total cost. The more resources 
conflicting parties devote to “arms”—the tools of conflict—the more destructive conflict 
becomes. By ignoring this dependence and instead treating conflict’s destruction cost as 
exogenous, conventional models of conflict imply that fights with fists are as destructive as 
fights with tanks and missiles. This has important ramifications for what conventional models 
predict about the likelihood of conflict. By rendering conflict cheaper than it really is, existing 
models significantly overpredict the probability of conflict. 
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 In this paper we developed two models of conflict—one in which conflict’s destruction 
costs are arms-independent and another in which those costs are arms-dependent—to show this. 
Our model with arms-independent destruction costs predicts more conflict than our model with 
arms-dependent destruction costs. 
 An experimental test of these models supports our theoretical predictions. In treatments 
where conflict’s destruction costs were severed from subjects’ arms investments, subjects 
engaged in substantially more conflict. In treatments in which conflict’s destruction costs were 
linked to subjects’ arms investments, subjects engaged in substantially more cooperation. 
Further, our experimental investigation demonstrated that when arms became cheaper, subjects 
cooperated more rather than less. This is consistent with the idea that when arms are less 
expensive, individuals invest more in them, making conflict more destructive when it occurs. 
The higher destructive costs of conflict that result encourage individuals to cooperate more. 
 These findings highlight the importance of unpacking the destructiveness parameter in 
models of conflict. In our arms-dependent model of conflict and corresponding experimental test, 
the destruction conflict creates interacts with individuals’ arms investments. This is an advance 
over conventional models of conflict where there’s no such interaction. However, our model’s 
characterization of conflict’s destruction cost, and thus the inferences one can draw from our 
experimental investigation, remains limited. In our model and experimental test, the destructive 
parameter itself remains exogenous. Future work should endogenize conflict’s destruction cost 
fully by endogenizing the destructiveness parameter—i.e., characterizing   as function of 
individuals’ arms investments and perhaps other variables. 
 Our results suggest that in natural environments, where conflict’s destruction costs are 
indeed linked to individuals’ investments in the tools of conflict, cooperation is more likely than 
conventional models of violent conflict predict. Future research incorporating that link more 
fully therefore promises to deliver more refined insights about the prevalence of cooperation vs. 
conflict in natural environments.  
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